On rogue states disrupting foreign networks
Much ink has been spilled lately (well, more likely, lots of electrons have changed their paths lately — as most of these communications have surely been electronic) on the effects, blame, assurance and everything related to the (allegedly) North Korean attack on Sony’s networks. And yes, the list of components and affectations is huge. Technically it was a very interesting feat, but it’s quite more interesting socially. Say, the not-so-few people wanting to wipe North Korea from the face of the Earth, as… Well, how did such a puny nation dare touch a private company that’s based in the USA?
Of course, there’s no strong evidence the attack did originate in (or was funded by) North Korea.
And… I have read very few people talking about the parallels to the infamous Stuxnet, malware written by USA and Israel (not officially admitted, but with quite a bit of evidence pointing to it, and no denial attempts after quite a wide media exposure). In 2010, this worm derailed Iran’s nuclear program. Iran, a sovereign nation. Yes, many people doubt such a nuclear program would be used “for good, not for evil” — But since when have those two words had an unambiguous meaning? And when did it become accepted as international law to operate based on hunches and a “everybody knows” mentality?
So, how can the same people repudiate NK’s alleged actions and applaud Stuxnet as a perfect weapon for peace?
tomás zerolo 2014-12-25 03:53:55
There are more sceptics.
As far as I am concerned, the theory that it was one of the three-letter agencies themselves ranges at about the same level: there’s some motive (they’re in desperate need of some love), and there is some precedent.
But far more plausible to me is the boring “some criminal hacker group” and/or just a disgruntled insider.